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                      Abstract       
 
Global warming is currently a major challenge faced by the world.  Reduction of carbon emissions 
is of paramount importance in the context of global warming. There are widespread ongoing efforts  
to find satisfactory ways of surmounting this challenge.  The basic objective of all such efforts can 
be summarized as conception and formation of protocols to reduce the pace of global carbon levels. 
Countries and global companies are now engaged in understanding systematic ways of achieving 
well defined emission targets. In this dissertation, we explore the specific problem faced by a global 
industry or global company in allocating carbon emission reduction units to its different divisions 
and supply chain partners in achieving a required target of reductions in its carbon reduction 
program. The problem becomes a challenging one since the divisions and supply chain partners are 
often autonomous and could exhibit strategic behavior. Game theory and mechanism design provide 
a natural modeling tool for capturing the strategic dynamics involved in this problem.  
 
DSIC (Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility), AE (Allocative Efficiency), and SBB  (Strict 
Budget Balance) are the key desirable properties for carbon reduction allocation mechanisms. 
But due to an impossibility result in mechanism design, DSIC, AE, and SBB can never be 
simultaneously achieved. Hence in this dissertation, we offer as contributions, two elegant solutions 
to this carbon emission reduction allocation problem.  The first contribution is a mechanism which 
is  DSIC and AE. We first propose a straightforward Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism 
based solution to the problem, leading to a DSIC and AE reverse auction protocol for allocating 
carbon reductions among the divisions. This solution, however, leads to a high level of budget 
imbalance. To reduce budget imbalance, we use redistribution mechanisms, without affecting the  
key properties of DSIC and AE. The Cavallo-Bailey redistribution mechanism, when applied to the 
above reverse auction protocol leads to reduced budget imbalance. To reduce the imbalance further, 
we propose an innovative forward auction protocol which achieves less imbalance when combined 
with the Cavallo-Bailey redistribution mechanism. The forward auction protocol also has the 
appealing feature of handsomely rewarding divisions that reduce emissions and levying appropriate 
penalties on divisions that do not participate in emission reductions. 
 
The second contribution is a DSIC and SBB mechanism. Even though the first mechanism tries to 
reduce the budget imbalance, there is always a surplus which cannot be distributed among divisions 
and is wasted. So, in this part, by slightly compromising on efficiency, we propose a mechanism 
which is DSIC and SBB. The SBB property guarantees that there is no need for any monetary 
support from an external agency for implementing the mechanism and there is no leakage of 
revenue. 
